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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No.  16-4339 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM JOSEPH BOYLE, 
                                         Appellant 
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District  
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-16-cr-00271-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 8, 2018 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  February 13, 2018) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 William Boyle pleaded guilty to counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud, 
and investment adviser fraud. He appeals his 78-month sentence, challenging the trial 
court’s application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for an offense involving “a 
misrepresentation or other fraudulent action during the course of a bankruptcy 
proceeding.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B). We will affirm.    
I. 
A. 
William Boyle is a former stock broker and investment adviser who founded his 
own company, Life Financial Planning, in 2008. Boyle was the sole owner of Life 
Financial Planning, offering stock broker, investment adviser, and financial planning 
services to clients. On March 10, 2009, Boyle was permanently barred by the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority from acting as a stock broker or otherwise associating in 
any capacity with a firm that sold securities to the public because of his misappropriation 
of over $500,000 in client funds. Despite this bar, Boyle continued to hold himself out to 
existing and prospective clients as an investment adviser or stock broker.    
  Between February of 2009 and December of 2015, Boyle defrauded multiple 
clients––many of whom were elderly and unsophisticated investors––out of more than 
$400,000. Rather than invest client money as promised, he took it for his own personal 
use, including paying for his children’s school tuition and purchasing a bar in 
Philadelphia which he renamed, “The Boyler Room.”   
 Federal agents first interviewed Boyle on April 29, 2015. On May 5, 2015, the 
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United States Attorney’s Office served Boyle with a target letter, informing him that he 
was the subject of a grand jury investigation.  
B. 
On December 15, 2015, Boyle filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on behalf of his 
bar, “The Boyler Room, Ltd.” As part of the proceedings, Boyle filed a form listing all 
debts owed to unsecured creditors. On this form, Boyle falsely characterized debts owed 
to two former clients in the amount of $180,000 and $35,000 as “loans.” In reality, these 
were not loans but money Boyle stole from these clients.  
In addition to this misrepresentation, testimony and exhibits presented to the trial 
court at sentencing showed Boyle made other misrepresentations to the bankruptcy court. 
For the $180,000 loan entry, Boyle listed the wrong name of his client’s trust fund. For 
the $35,000 entry, Boyle listed an incorrect address. Moreover, because Boyle filed the 
bankruptcy case on behalf of his bar, “The Boyler Room,” notices sent to debtors 
contained the bar’s name, not Boyle’s. As a result, when two of Boyle’s clients received 
notice from the bankruptcy court of the meeting of creditors, see 11 U.S.C. § 341, they 
did not understand the notice (they did not know Boyle owed the bar) and did not attend 
the meeting.   
C. 
 On June 30, 2016, a grand jury indicted Boyle, charging him with five counts of 
mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343; one count of 
securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff; and one count of investment adviser fraud, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b–6 and 80b–17. He pleaded guilty to all counts on August 30, 2017.  
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 At sentencing, the trial court applied several enhancements under the sentencing 
guidelines, including the only enhancement challenged on appeal: a two-level 
enhancement for an offense involving “a misrepresentation or other fraudulent action 
during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B).  
II.* 
 Boyle contends the trial court erred in applying this enhancement because: (1) he 
was not charged with bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157; (2) the mail, securities, 
and investment advisor fraud he was charged with occurred prior to the bankruptcy case 
and not “during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding”; (3) there was no financial loss 
attributable to his actions in the bankruptcy case; and (4) he complied with bankruptcy 
law by disclosing all debts, see 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(A), he did not intend to defraud or 
misrepresent the bankruptcy court, and he did not benefit from the bankruptcy. These 
arguments lack merit. The trial judge properly interpreted the guideline and did not 
commit clear error when he concluded Boyle made a misrepresentation during the 
bankruptcy proceeding.    
 First, Boyle cites no authority for the proposition that § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B) applies 
only to those charged with bankruptcy fraud. The plain text of the guideline supports the 
opposite conclusion: the enhancement applies “[i]f the offense involved . . . a 
misrepresentation or other fraudulent action during the course of a bankruptcy 
                                              
*  The trial court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a trial court’s “interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its application of the guidelines to the facts for clear 
error.” United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 850 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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proceeding.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B) (emphasis added). The phrase “the offense 
involved” indicates the enhancement is not limited to a single charge, let alone 
bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157. Indeed, the offense of bankruptcy fraud would 
always involve a fraudulent action “during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding.” See 
id. Accordingly, the enhancement would be nonsensical if it only applied to bankruptcy 
fraud. See United States v. Simpson, 796 F.3d 548, 551, 555–56 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming imposition of the same enhancement where defendant was not charged with 
bankruptcy fraud).  
 Second, and as an initial matter, Boyle incorrectly asserts that he filed for 
bankruptcy after the charged conduct. The indictment, however, alleged a scheme to 
defraud “[b]eginning in or about February 2009 and continuing until or about December 
2015.” App. Vol. II, at 4. Boyle filed for bankruptcy on December 15, 2015.  
In any event, the filing of the bankruptcy petition after the fraud scheme ended 
would not have precluded the trial court from imposing the enhancement. In applying the 
sentencing guidelines, the trial court is to consider the defendant’s relative culpability 
based on all relevant conduct, i.e., conduct defined in § 1B1.3 “and not simply on the 
basis of the elements and acts referenced in the count of conviction.” United States v. 
Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1998). Conduct that occurs “in the course of 
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense” is relevant conduct to be 
considered when applying the sentencing guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). Therefore, the 
timing of the bankruptcy petition is immaterial in this case––the record demonstrates 
Boyle’s misrepresentations to the bankruptcy court were an attempt to evade detection of 
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his fraudulent scheme. See United States v. Tanke, 743 F.3d 1296, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 
2014) (applying the enhancement where bankruptcy proceeding occurred four years after 
completion of fraud scheme); see id. at 1307 (“[Defendant’s] false testimony in the 
bankruptcy proceeding may not have occurred in preparation for or during the 
commission of the offense, but it plainly occurred ‘in the course of attempting to avoid 
detection or responsibility for that offense.’” (quoting U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)).    
Third, it is immaterial whether there was a financial loss attributable to Boyle’s 
actions as a result of the bankruptcy case. The financial loss attributable to Boyle is 
assessed under a different guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1); see also U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (providing extensive discussion of loss calculation). The text of 
§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(B), in contrast, does not contain a financial loss requirement, and Boyle 
cites no authority to the contrary.    
Fourth, Boyle’s assertion that he was complying with the bankruptcy law 
requirement to disclose all debts is demonstrably false. As explained above, he 
misrepresented two of his debt entries as “loans” from his clients, when, in fact, he had 
stolen money from his clients. In addition, Boyle failed to disclose to the bankruptcy 
court debts owed to his other victims. Boyle claims he did not intend to defraud the 
bankruptcy court or misrepresent his obligations. But the trial court found that he did, 
and, based on the record, this conclusion was far from clear error. Finally, Boyle’s 
assertion that he did not benefit from the bankruptcy proceeding is irrelevant, as that is 
not a requirement of § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B).  
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.  
